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SECURED TRANSACTIONS. By William B. Davenport and Damel R. 
Murray PhiladelphIa, Pennsylvama: The Amencan Law Institute 
1978. 
Revtewed by Hon. Ellen A. Peters* 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS by William B. Davenport and Damel 
R. Murray IS one of a senes of texts published by the Amencan 
Law Institute-Amencan Bar AssocIatIon Committee on Contmumg 
ProfeSSIOnal EducatIon (ALI-ABA). ThIS text IS a reVlSlon of an 
earlier work published m 1966 by Ray D Henson and the current 
semor author ALI-ABA handbooks on the vanous artICles of the 
Uniform CommercIal Code have been, as the foreword mdicates, 
an Important part of ALI-ABA s educatIonal programs for the bar 
Although published m paperback,l m what IS denommated a stu­
dent editIon, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IS a book by practitIoners 
for practitIoners. Like its predecessor, the text presents an orderly 
overVIew rather than a critIcal analYSIS of the prOVlSlons of ArtICle 9 
of the Uniform CommerCIal Code, the Secured TransactIons ArtI­
cle. The authors have endeavored to illummate m 400 pages the 
complexitIes mherent m the orgamzatIon and theoretIcal framework 
of ArtICle 9 to enable practitIOners who are nOVIces with respect to 
ArtIcle 9 to cope successfully with problems likely to be encoun­
tered m the course of theIr practIce. 2 ThIS IS a tall order 
It IS true that Karl Llewellyn S3 VISIOn for the Uniform Com­
merCIal Code was the creatIon of a body of law that would be read­
ily accessible to everyone engaged m commerce and a fortIon to 
anyone tramed m the law Llewellyn felt, not without JustificatIon, 
that commerCIal law had become artifiCIally complex because of ar 
cane common law constructs such as title, whICh dommated the 
law of sales, and overlappmg mconsistent statutes, such as those 
ASSOCiate Justice, Connecticut Supreme Court; Professor (Adjunct), Yale Law 
School. 
1. SECURED TRANSACTIONS IS also available m hardbound edition. 
2. Preface to W DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS at IX 
(1978) [heremafter cited by sectIOn and page numbers onlyJ. 
3. Karl Llewellyn was the pnnclpal draftsman (and Chief Reporter) for the Um­
fonn CommerCial Code. 
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then regulatmg secured transactIons. 4 The goal of codificatIon al­
ways has been to bnng order out of chaos by cuttmg away the un­
derbrush of accumulated precedent. There IS no questIon that the 
Uniform CommercIal Code has m fact enabled commercIal law to 
take a quantum leap mto the 20th century to resolve more suc­
cessfully and more expeditiously many of the problems that 
plagued clients and practitIoners and courts ever smce the enact­
ment of the last commercIal codificatIon at the turn of the cen­
tury 5 We are vastly mdebted to the Amencan Law Institute and 
the National Conference of CommIssIoners on Uniform State Laws 
and all of the mdividuals who helped to draft the Uniform Com­
merCIal Code. They produced an enormously .useful Code-but 
not a mIracle. For it would have taken a mIracle sImultaneously to 
modermze and to SImplifY the vast array of transactions governed 
by the Uniform CommercIal Code. The legal philosophy underly­
mg the Uniform CommercIal Code, that Identifiable fact patterns 
would prOVIde a better gmde to the resolution of commercIal con­
flicts than articulatIon of analytic pnnciples, IS clear enough, but le­
gal realism ultImately proved madequate to the challenge. Over 
the twenty years that the Code was drafted, it became necessary to 
develop new constructs, 6 such as acceptance and "identification" 
m Article 2, and "perfection and proceeds, and, more recently 
"last event, m ArtIcle 9. As long as facts contmue to be suffi­
CIently unruly not to fall meluctably mto one exclusIve pattern, the 
resolution of disputes IS Immeasurably aIded by standards and 
gmdelines and, mevitably legal pnnciples. Inescapably these legal 
prmcIples can always be Improved by the applicatIon of the law­
4. One of the more obscure of the pre-Code statutes governmg chattel security 
arrangements was the Uniform Trust ReceIpts Act (1933), whIch Llewellyn hImself 
had drafted. 
5. The nucleus of the first Amencan codification of commercIal law was the 
promulgation of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896) and the Uniform 
Sales Act (1906). Other statutes such as the Uniform Bills of Lading Act (1909) and 
the Uniform Warehouse ReceIpts Act (1906) are essentially elaborations on and 
amendments of particular proVISIOns of the Uniform Sales Act. Later enactments like 
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1918) and the Uniform Trust ReceIpts Act (1933) 
were both narrower m scope and less WIdely accepted. Although many state legIsla­
tures enacted vanety of commerCIal statutes to govern chattel mortgages, factor 
liens, and accounts receIvable finanCIng, these statutes were neither uniform nor part 
of general codification. For an account of the hIstory that led to the first codifica­
tion, see G. GILMORE, THE ACES OF AMERICAN LAw 69-72 (1977) and G. Gilmore, 
CommerCial Law In the United States: Its Codification and other Misadventures, In 
ASPECTS OF COMMERCIAL LAw' SALES, CONSUMER CREDIT, AND SECURED TRANS­
ACTIONS 449 0. Ziepel & W Foster eds. 1969). 
6. G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 85-86. 
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yer s skill m discovenng refinements and distmctIons. In the end, 
the law IS often better but it IS rarely simpler And so it IS with 
the Code. 
The authors effort to provIde a comprehensible overvIew of 
ArtICle 9 starts with a sensible orgamzatIonal plan that deals sepa­
rately with agreement, perfectIon, default, and pnoritIes. These 
are certamly the cornerstones that are essentIal to an understand­
mg of secured transactions. Withm each of these major subdivI­
SIOns, the authors reVieW the text of the prOVISIons of ArtICle 9 m 
its 1962 and its 1972 verSIOns, notmg differences where applicable 
and reportmg many of the salient cases. The text IS emmently 
readable, and, especIally m the chapter on pnoritIes, con tams 
numbers of illummatmg hypothetIcal problems. As an exegesIs on 
the prOVlSlons of ArtIcle 9 of the Code, taken section by section, 
the text IS remarkably successful m provIding m one bnef volume a 
great deal of useful mformatIon. 
Invanably m a text of limited scope and SIze, the authors make 
chOIces of emphaSIS and ellipsIs that should not be faulted although 
they would not necessarily be shared by others workmg and teach­
mg m the field. Nonetheless, withm the ambit of the task whICh 
the authors have set for themselves, I found some omISSIOns per 
plexmg. In the literature of secured transactIons and m the 
caselaw 7 one recurrent Issue has been the extent to whICh the exe­
cution of a financmg statement, 8 whose pnmary purpose IS to no­
tifY thIrd persons of the eXIstence of a security mterest, can be 
made to serve the reqUIrements of a written security agreement9 
whose pnmary purpose IS to serve as a statute of frauds between 
the contractmg partIes. I was unable to find thIs question ad­
dressed anywhere m the chapter on Security Agreements although 
the chapter on PerfectIon, m its mtroductory sectIon10 states, accu­
rately enough, when a written security agreement IS reqUIred m a 
secured transaction and none eXIsts, the filing of a financmg state­
ment covenng the secured transactIon does not perfect the security 
mterest until the prereqUIsite of the written security agreement, 
also reqUIred for attachment, IS fulfilled. But surely thIs IS both 
too little and too late. The Issue IS precIsely whether the prereqUI­
site of the written security IS, with or without parol eVIdence, ful­
7. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNI­
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 788-91 (1972). 
8. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1972). 
9. Id. § 9-203(1). 
10. § 4.01 at p. 116. 
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filled by the filing of the financmg statement. That Issue IS neither 
clearly Identified not resolved; nor can a newcomer to ArtIcle 9 
reasonably be expected to find the relevant references concernmg 
security agreements m a chapter dealing with perfection. 
A second fundamental Issue that has gIven nse to boundless 
litIgatIon concerns the distmctIon between leases whICh are m­
tended, or are found by courts to have been mtended, to be secu­
rity mterests and leases whIch are pure" leases outSIde of the 
regulatory scope of ArtICle 9. That Issue IS bnefly conSIdered m the 
chapter concerned with the baSIC concepts and scope of ArtIcle 9. 11 
I am skeptIcal whether so abbrevIated a discussIOn IS likely to serve 
as an adequate mtroductIon to the complexitIes of cases such as In 
re Leastng Consultants, Inc. 12 and Cittzens and Southern Eqmp­
ment Leastng, Inc. v. Atlanta Federal Savtngs and Loan Assocw­
twn. 13 Furthermore, the authors predictIon that a lease without an 
optIon to purchase would be unlikely ever to be construed to cre­
ate a security mterest has been recently proved erroneous by Bill 
Swad Leastng Co. v. Stikes (In re Tillery).14 The line between 
leases and security agreements IS sufficIently erratIc and opaque to 
have warranted more extensIve treatment. 15 
Two problems with the diSCUSSIOn of perfectIon illustrate re­
lated concerns about the accuracy of the text at some Important 
Junctures. It IS vital that a comprehensIve text be espeCIally ex­
plicit about the Code s concept of, and directIves for, perfectIons. 
PerfectIon IS after all the crucible by whICh security mterests are 
tested. An unperfected security mterest does not survIVe the debt­
or s bankruptcy and, hence, IS least efficaCIOUs when most needed. 
The authors mtroductory definitIon of perfectIon as obtammg the 
maxImum protectIon available for the partIcular type of collateral 
"16 IS unfortunately both maccurate and mIsleading. It fails en­
tIrely to correspond to the Code s definitIon,17 a reference not 
without difficulty but nonetheless one that cannot readily be Ig­
nored or subordinated to a footnote. 18 It fails to mform the reader 
11. § 2.04(a) at pp. 27-28. 
12. 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973) (cited In § 4.07(a) at p. 210 n.338). 
13. 144 Ga. App. 800, 243 S.E.2d 243 (1978). 
14. 571 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1978). 
15. It would have been adVIsable to have noted In the diSCUSSIOn of exclUSIOns 
(rather than, or perhaps In addition to § 2.04(c) at p. 30), the surpnsIngly successful 
escape of the surety from Article 9. § 2.03(b) at p. 18. 
16. § 4.01 at p. 115. 

17 U.C.C. § 9-303 (1972). 

18. § 4.01 n.7 at p. 116. 
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of the fundamental distmctlOn between perfectIon and pnority that 
IS one of the most Important orgamzmg pnncIples of ArtIcle 9. 19 
ThIS distmctIon IS best exemplified by the Code s sectIons concern­
mg purchase money security mterests m consumer goods. Without 
the filing of a financmg statement, such security mterests are auto­
matIcally perfected;20 but a financmg statement must be filed if the 
secured creditor IS mterested m aVOIding subordinatIon to a subse­
quent good faith consumer purchaser 21 I do not mean to suggest 
that the authors fail to recogmze thIS distmctIon, but I cannot ac­
cept theIr assertlOn22 that theIr definitIon effectIvely expresses the 
Idea that perfectIon confers pnority over some classes of competI­
tors but not over others. 
The authors, furthermore, are sometImes unclear about Imple­
mentatIon of the rules for perfectIon. An mstance anses out of theIr 
diSCUSSIOn of chattel paper Although confrontmg some of the diffi­
cultIes that mhere both m the concept23 and m the operatIon24 of 
security mterests m the form of chattel paper, the authors do not 
suffiCIently warn of related pitfalls that may not be self-evIdent to 
the ArtIcle 9 newcomer Chattel paper IS generated whenever writ­
mgs evidence both a monetary obligatIon and a security mterest m, 
or a lease of, specific goods. 25 A typICal example IS the executIon of 
a security mterest, formerly known as a conditIonal sales con­
tract, and a promISSOry note m conjunctIon with the purchase of an 
automobile on tIme. The chattel paper may be discounted by as­
SIgnment to a thIrd party and thIS refinancmg may m turn be per 
fected either by filing or by takIng posseSSIon of the chattel paper 
The authors adVIse, soundly that perfectIon by posseSSIOn IS ordi­
narily preferable to perfectIon by filing, smce posseSSIon elimmates 
the hazard of unauthonzed subsequent transfers of the chattel pa­
per 26 They fail to warn, however, that perfectIon as to the chattel 
paper, whatever its form, IS not necessarily effectIve as perfectIon 
with regard to the security mterest m the underlymg chattel. 27 In 
19. Compare U.C.c. §§ 9-301 to -306 with U.C.C. §§ 9-307 to -316. 
20. V.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1972). 
21. Id. § 9-307(2). 
22. § 4.01 at p. 115. 
23. § 2.10(c) at pp. 71-75. 
24. § 4.07(a) at pp. 209-12. 
25. U.C.C. § 9-105(b) (1972). 
26. § 4.07(a) at p. 211. 
27. Negotiable documents of title, m contradistinction to chattel paper, do m­
corporate nghts as to underlymg goods. Under the U.C.C., security mterests m goods 
subject to document must be perfected by perfecting security mterest m the doc­
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the example above, delivery of the security agreement and the 
note to the secured creditor perfects that creditor s nghts agamst 
other takers from the aSSIgnor the automobile dealer but does not 
obvIate the need to perfect a security mterest m the automobile 
agaInst takers from the buyer Perhaps the dealer will already mde­
pendently have perfected and then the secured creditor as asSIgnee 
IS protected without reperfectIon. 28 Perhaps the distmctIon be­
tween the two security mterests IS so transparently obvIOUS that no 
reader could possibly be mIsled. My SUspICIon IS that dealers do 
not always enter liens on certificates of title, and my expenence 
with students has been one of consIderable confuSIOn about the du­
ality of mterests mcorporated m chattel paper In any case, I would 
have supposed that precautIons for the nOVIce practitIoner about 
mqUIry mto nghts m the underlymg collateral would have been at 
least as appropnate as precautIOns about chattel paper executed m 
duplicate or tnplicate. 29 
Other readers of SECURED TRANSACTIONS may find these 
omISSIons less troublesome than I do. It IS arguable that occasIOnal 
lapses, if such they are, are outweIghed by the excellence of the 
presentatIon of such Issues as multIstate transactIons and pnoritIes. 
On the latter subject, the authors effectIvely demonstrate the WIS­
dom of theIr mtroductory observatIon that the rules for pnority are 
best exammed m the context of concrete problems. 30 The complex­
ity of theIr hypothetIcals does, however, belie theIr rather sangume 
observatIon about the relatIve ease with whICh most problems of 
pnority can be resolved. 31 
My fundamental difficulty with thIS text, and more generally 
with the genre of one-volume mtroductory texts, IS that I am less 
ument. U.C.C. § 9-304(2} (1972). Davenport and Murray discuss the merger problem 
with respect to leases In § 4.07(a}, but fail to address the more customary case of the 
ordinary security Interest. Why the doctrine of merger has not been extended to chat­
tel paper IS not clear. Possibly the reason IS based on the fact that chattel paper In­
cludes monetary obligations that are not negotiable In form. Merger has historically 
been an aspect of protection for holder In due course of negotiable paper. Possibly 
the reason lies In commercial trade and usage. The kInds of goods that are apt to be 
the subject of bailment are commerCially unlike the specific chattels that are apt to 
become the underlYIng collateral for chattel paper. In these respects, chattel paper 
may usefully be seen as halfway house between documents of title and accounts 
receivable. Accounts also may arise out of the sale of goods, but the assignment of 
accounts carries with it no expectations whatsoever about chattel security. 
28. U.C.C. § 9-302(2} (1972). 
29. § 4.07(a} at p. 211. 
30. § 7.01 at p. 304. 
31. ld. 
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sangume than are the authors about the nsks of oversimplification. 
Even m law and especially m the law of secured transactions, a lit­
tle knowledge can be a dangerous thmg. Nowhere does the present 
volume more clearly illustrate the problem of oversimplification 
than m the superficiality of its treatment of the relationship be­
tween Article 9 and the federal law of bankruptcy The authors ac 
knowledge, of course, that bankruptcy IS, m their words, "the aCid 
test" for secured transactions. The authors, themselves seasoned 
practitioners, clearly appreciate the senousness of this "aCid test." 
But IS the novice practitioner bemg well served when he IS m­
formed, essentially without qualification, that: (1) A secured party 
need have no fear about the enforceability of a well-documented 
security mterest m bankruptcy·32 (2) a secured party can rely on 
the case law to have validated the Code s floating lien on mventory 
and accounts vis-a-vIs the Bankruptcy Act;33 (3) a secured party 
can, m bankruptcy aVOid vulnerability for filing a financmg state­
ment withm 21 days, even though the Code allows only 10 days?34 
The problems that bankruptcy poses for a secured lender are 
Significantly exacerbated by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Re­
form Act of 1978,35 effectIve October 1, 1979. The authors were 
undoubtedly unfortunate to have come mto pnnt Just as thiS new 
Act was bemg enacted. But its enactment had been presaged by 
years of diSCUSSion m study commiSSIOns and m the Congress, and 
the tendency of its reVlSlon to favor debtors and unsecured cred­
itors was clearly foreseeable. In each of the mstances m which the 
authors offer words of reassurance to the secured creditor, he IS 
now m greater Jeopardy than he was before, and he was not free of 
nsk even on September 30, 1979. 
On the enforceability of security mterests m bankruptcy it IS 
noteworthy that adequacy of documentatIon, while necessary IS 
not mvanably suffiCient to assure happmess after bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy means that secured collateral IS likely to be managed 
through the admmlstratIve office of the bankruptcy court and can­
not Simply be pnvately repossessed m the event of default. Under 
the new Act, bankruptcy JunsdictIon attaches even to property m 
the posseSSIOn of the secured creditor;36 it has always governed the 
32. § 6.11 at p. 301. 
33. § 3.07 at p. 108. 
34. § 4.03(c) at p. 161. 
35. 11 V.S.C.A. H 101-151326 (West Supp. 1979). 
36. 28 V.S.C.A. § 1471(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (effective April I, 1984). 
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much more frequent case of collateral III the possessIOn of the 
debtor 37 Bankruptcy admlllIstratIon has been known to entail pro­
longed and extensIve litIgatIon concermng even exqUIsitely docu­
mented secured transactIons,38 and even Impeccable documenta­
tIon has been known to be outweIghed III bankruptcy by the 
debtor s need to use the secured collateral.39 Furthermore, no doc 
umentatIon can alter the fact that the filing of a petitIon III bank­
ruptcy serves automatIcally to exclude subsequently-acqUIred prop­
erty from the ambit of the security lllterest. 
The vIability of the floatlllg lien of a security lllterest III lllven­
tory or m accounts, m the event of bankruptcy IS dramatIcally lim­
ited by the preference sectIon of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 40 
DuBay v. Williams, 41 the case that has come to be seen as the 
pnncIpal case upholding the floatmg lien, has not had a good press 
either m bankruptcy cIrcles or among aficIOnados of the Code. 42 
Its flat holding that any after-acqUIred property arrangement IS 
totally validated by compliance with the Code s mstructIons for the 
filing of a financmg statement mIght well have been limited, even 
under the old Bankruptcy Act, to cases lllvolvmg the fact pattern 
that DuBay itself illustrates. DuBay dealt with the easy case, the 
substitutIon of essentIally fungible collateral of substantIally equal 
value. The hard case IS the case III whIch the debtor s estate would 
be dimImshed, on the eve of bankruptcy 43 by permittmg a for 
merly undersecured creditor to mvoke hIS security mterest to Im­
prove hIS positIon at the expense of the debtor s estate. None of 
the reported cases has apparently had to face thIS Issue. Its out­
come, hIghly doubtful under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, IS now 
clear: the transactIon IS preferentIal44 and the secured creditor 
37 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1976) (repealed 1979). 
38. See, e.g., In re New Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958). 
39. See, e.g., In re Yale Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966). 
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West. Supp. 1979). 
41. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969). 
42. The study committee for the bankruptcy reform commiSSIOn that was 
charged with consldenng reVISIOn of federal bankruptcy law III light of the enact­
ment of the U.C.C. was chaIred by Professor Grant Gilmore, prInCIpal draftsman of 
Article 9. The Gilmore report critiCIzed DuBay and recommended reform sImilar In 
pnnclple to the present § 547. 417 F.2d at 1277. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFER­
ENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6164. 
43. Formerly four months under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 96 (1976) (repealed 1979), now 90 days (or one year if an InsIder) under the Bank­
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Supp. 1979). 
44. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) & (e)(3) (West Supp. 1979). 
161 1979] BOOK REVIEW 
loses. No one should enter mto mventory or accounts receIvable 
financmg without an understanding of thIs nsk, and without some 
suggestion about practical means for mimmIzmg the nsk. An ap­
propnate warnmg IS especIally Important here, because the Code s 
abolitIon45 of the rule of Benedict v Ratner46 can easily be 
overread. Benedict reqUIred that a secured transaction be policed 
as a conditIon of its mtnnsIC validity and that reqUIrement m those 
terms IS no longer the law But regular monitonng of the state of 
the secured collateral while it IS entrusted to the debtor may well 
contmue to be sound commercIal advIce for other reasons, such as 
aVOIdance of the law of preference. 
The extent to whICh belated filing of a financmg statement can 
be deemed timely for bankruptcy purposes, by reference to the 
proVIsIons of sectIon 60 of the now-superseded Bankruptcy Act of 
189847 IS a matter that IS today arguably only of histoncal mterest. 
The Issue has not, to the best of my knowledge, surfaced m litIga­
tion, and the learned commentators have always been m profound 
disagreement. 48 Under these CIrcumstances, the assertIon that sec­
tIon 60 will come to the rescue to validate a filing withm the 
21-day penod followmg executIon of the secured transactIOn IS hard 
to Justify Since October 1, 1979, reliance upon such adVIce would 
be extraordinarily precanous. The new preference sectIon not only 
elimmates any 21-day penod, but cuts back on the Code sown 
provlSlon of shelter for belated filing, withm 10 days, of purchase 
money security mterests. Under the Code, the lO-day penod be­
gms to run from the date on whICh the debtor receIved posseSSIOn 
of the secured collateral;49 under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the 
security mterest must be perfected "before 10 days after such secu­
rity mterest attaches. "50 PartIcularly m purchase money transac­
tIons, m whIch the collateral necessarily represents new value, it IS 
45. U.C.C. § 9-205 (1972). 
46. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). 
47. Section 60(a)(7)I.(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that the time of 
transfer (for the purposes of the law of preference) be determmed to allow twenty­
one day penod for recording where applicable state law failed to proVide stated pe­
nod withm whICh recordation had to be accomplished. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7)I.(B) 
(1976) (repealed 1979). 
48. Compare lA P COOGAN, W HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.03(5)(c), at 994 (1965) with 2 G. 
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.8, at 1325 (1965) and 
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER­
CIAL CODE 874 (1972). 
49. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1972). 
50. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1979). 
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likely that the security Interest will attach before the debtor re­
ceIves posseSSIOn of the collateral. Far from extending the tIme to 
perfect, the new Bankruptcy Act makes prompt filing more urgent. 
A text entitled SECURED TRANSACTIONS that contams no sys­
tematIc treatment of the relevant aspects of the law of bankruptcy51 
and offers Instead pIecemeal advIce that IS more apt to mIslead 
than to Inform will not, I believe, be a useful resource. No one has 
the nght to expect answers to every hypothetIcal or to the first 
case m litIgatIon. But, pressed for tIme, IS it not more appropnate 
to cautIon rather than to Instill overconfidence, to provIde gmde­
lines and to suggest general pnnciples, rather than to leapfrog, 
through narrowly chosen examples, over the most difficult ques­
tIons that the practitIoner and the student of secured transactIOns 
must learn to resolve? 
The matter of general pnncipies bnngs me to my final obser 
vatIon about the orgamzatIon and the scope of the text under re­
VIew When the Uniform CommercIal Code was first promulgated, 
more than twenty-five years ago, it was the path of Wisdom to ap­
proach it piecemeal, to try to asSImilate its prOVISIOns artICle by 
artICle. I wonder whether that approach has not now been ex­
hausted m the extenSIve literature that the Code has generated. To 
purlom the related observatIon of ChIef JustIce Marshall In 
M'Culioch v. Maryland,52 it IS a Code we are expounding. 53 Com­
merCial transactIons routmely transcend the necessarily artifiCial 
lines of the varIOUS Code ArtIcles. The Code s divlSlon mto ArtIcles 
was not mtended to create a senes of Iron curtaInS but reflects 
rather the histoncal aCCIdent of pre-eXIstIng laws separately ad­
dreSSIng sales of goods, bills and notes, and chattel mortgages. It IS 
not always easy to reconcile the commandments of the vanous ArtI­
cles,54 espeCIally smce they exhibit conSIderable diversity In 
draftmg style. Nonetheless, thIs IS the analytIc task that students of 
the Code must confront In the 1980's. Only when we have 
51. The text containS no separate chapter or subdiVISIOn devoted to problems 
created by the law of bankruptcy Bankruptcy IS discussed Instead In §§ 3.07, 4.03(c), 
and 6.11. Some specific hypotheticals are bnefly conSIdered In the pnorities chapter, 
In §§ 7.03(j) and 7.03(j)(5). 
52. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
53. See Judge Wisdom SImilar observation about the LoUISIana Civil Code. 
Shelp National Surety Corporation, 333 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1964) (Wisdom, J.). 
54. As starter, the follOWing inconsIstencIes In U.C.C. sections may be noted: 
(a) 9-113 and 2-401, (b) 9-318(4) and 2-210(2); (c) 9-307(1) and 2-403(2); (d) 9-206 and 
3-302; and (e) 9-309 and 7-503(1). 
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achIeved a firmer understanding of the fundamental pnnciples, 
sometImes the competmg fundamental prmciples,55 that the Code 
as a whole embodies, will we have a sure footmg for concrete ad­
VIce about the problems that confront the practitIoner m hIs first 
encounter with any aspect of the Uniform CommercIal Code. 
55. For first mqUiry mto an exploration of some of these Issues, see Jackson 
& Peters, Quest for Uncertamty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent 
Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform CommercIal Code, 87 
YALE L.J. 907 (1978). 
